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INTRODUCTION  
At a conceptual level, this article explores the relationship between developments and 
actions at the global and regional levels of analysis. To ask whether events at the global 
level affect the regional level more than vice versa is fruitless because they affect each 
other at different degrees. The more interesting question hinges on how and why they do 
so in any particular context.  
Partly in order to explore that issue, this article addresses the following questions: how 
have US-Russian relations changed in Southwest Asia as a result of the fall of the USSR? 
what is the nature of US and Russian involvement in the region? what is the relationship 
between their interaction at the global level and their actions and standing in the Persian 
Gulf region?  
These questions are of obvious importance. The end of the Cold War has not made US-
Russian involvement and interaction in the Third World irrelevant. Rather, by 
transforming relations at the global level, it has altered realities at the regional level and 
vice versa. Understanding and explaining US-Russian relations is particularly important 
given the changing global and regional landscape in which they now take place. Russia 
remains an important, although disjointed, state in world politics with ongoing, evolving 
interests in various areas of the Third World. For its part, the Persian Gulf is likely to 
remain critical to the functioning of the entire global economy well into the twenty-first 
century.1  
While the future of US-Russian relations in any Third World context will depend on 
many factors, including power struggles in Moscow and Washington, and the nature of 
the particular Third World context, several arguments about these relations seem sensible 
at present regarding Southwest Asia.  
First, despite the fall of the USSR and Russias serious internal problems, Russia 
undoubtedly remains interested in enhancing its position in the Gulf region. While its 
foreign policy establishment appears divided on a range of issues, Russia nonetheless has 
sought seriously to develop political, military and economic ties to Iran and Arab Gulf 
states.2 Moreover, although US-Russian relations are on a more cooperative footing in 
some areas of interaction, important elements in the Russian government remain inclined 
to view US-Russian interaction as a power struggle in which Moscow at times needs to 
check the United States.  
Second, while the decline of the Soviet Union hurt Moscows position in the broader 
Middle East, in some ways, it improved its economic and political position in the Persian 
Gulf. In the 1970s and 1980s, Moscows position was handicapped by its global ideology, 
menacing military reputation, atheistic propensities, and poor record in dealing with the 
Muslim world. This was demonstrated most clearly in its 1979 invasion of next-door 
Afghanistan.3 While the end of the Cold War did not altogether decrease the importance 
of these factors, it diminished them as impediments to Russian relations with regional 
states. As this article seeks to show, Russia has made strides in the areas of diplomatic 
contact and trade, although its arms sales efforts have suffered seriously since the end of 
the 1991 Gulf war.  
Third, while the US and Russia remain competitive at the regional level in some areas of 
interaction, Russia is constrained by its preoccupation with internal instability and 
economic problems, and by its evolving, more cooperative relations with the United 
States at the global level. Moscows reluctance to disrupt this cooperation, and to lose the 
economic and political benefits that may arise from it, circumscribes just how far it will 
challenge Washington in a Third World arena like Southwest Asia.  
Fourth, the changing context of global affairs and of US-Russian interaction, requires an 
adjustment in theory as it pertains to conceptualizing these relations. At the theoretical 
level, we advance the argument in the conclusion of this article that the realist model 
remains relevant in explaining the US and Russian role and interaction at both the 
regional and international level. However, partly as a result of the end of the Cold War, 
the liberal model and its various sub-schools of thought are assuming greater relevance as 
guides to their interaction at the global level.  
Conceptualizing The Micro-Macro Link  
The theoretical literature in international relations increasingly recognizes the importance 
of considering the relationship between areas of interaction that are often treated as 
separate but are in fact linked. Despite the fact that they represent different theoretical 
traditions, both neorealists, such as Joseph Grieco, and neoliberalists and their associated 
thinkers, such as Robert Keohane, urge greater efforts to forge theoretical links between 
domestic- and international-level variables.4  
For his part, Robert Putnam develops a conceptual framework for understanding how 
diplomacy and domestic politics interact, thus accounting for how these two levels affect 
the decision-making of leaders.5 In this genre, Steven David argues that we cannot 
understand the balancing efforts of Third World nations without recognizing that their 
action is driven partly by concerns about maintaining their own power, position and 
prestige at home.6 Preceding these efforts are a series of works in the literatures of 
interdependence, regional integration, foreign policy analysis, and Third World politics 
that also explore the domestic-international link.7  
The notion of how the micro- and macro- levels are related can assume many forms in 
various contexts and issue areas. In the works discussed above, it is manifested in terms 
of domestic-international links. In this article the relationship explored is between the 
global and regional levels. These levels are not viewed here as static but, rather, as 
dynamic, evolving structures, constantly revising themselves and their relation to each 
other in response to change and perceptions of change.  
Analyzing "global" and "regional" as two levels of analysis raises the prior question of 
the extent to which we can we really distinguish them conceptually. Part of our argument 
is that, while these levels are different in some ways, distinguishing between them 
appears to be getting harder given the end of the Cold War and global change. Indeed, 
while some debate ensues on the issue, much evidence suggests that interconnectedness 
and interdependence has risen in the twentieth century and continues to rise, albeit faster 
in the developed world than in the Third World.8 As a result, understanding and 
explaining the behavior of nations at the global level increasingly requires study of events 
and factors at the regional level and vice versa.  
At the same time, however, basic conceptual differences, while increasingly fuzzy, do 
exist between the two levels. As Barry Buzan has put it, regions are different from the 
"seamless web of relationships that connects all of the states in the international system."9 
Four differences are worthwhile pointing out.  
First, the term "global" often refers to the behavior, actions, and interaction of major 
powers, such as Russia, the US, China, France and Britain, particularly when it concerns 
international issues that cross-cut regions. We rarely refer to the actions of weaker states 
as part of the global level of analysis. "Global" and "regional" thus can be distinguished, 
to some extent, by the influence and position of the actors that comprise them.  
Second, the global level may be distinguished by its processes. The changing distribution 
of power, the pace and impact of technological change, or the development of an open, 
international economy represent such processes. While technological change, for 
instance, occurs in the Third World as well, it often does so at a different pace and 
intensity than at the global level. Similarly, the distribution of power assumes different 
dimensions at both levels in terms of the actors that comprise it and their capabilities. It is 
hardly profound to note that the world can be multipolar at the global level, while any 
region might be unipolar or bipolar, or vice versa. While the distribution of capabilities at 
the regional and global levels are often linked, they are also different in their own right.  
Third, at the global level, different issues are sometimes emphasized than at the regional 
level. Transnational issues, such as global warming, over-population, and international 
economic problems, are often treated as "global" rather than just as regional issues. 
Increasingly, they are cross-regional problems that require multilateral cooperation to 
ameliorate or solve.  
Fourth, the parameters of the two levels of analysis are different. In addition to 
geography, some scholars believe that regions can be delimited partly by ideology, 
religion, ethnic, or common economic considerations. The evolving literature on 
regionalism or regional blocs argues this point.10 The global level, by contrast, is harder 
to delimit.  
US and Russian Involvement In The Persian Gulf (1991-96)  
In order to examine the central questions of this article and to establish its main 
arguments, we explore four areas of US-Russian interaction in the Persian Gulf from 
1991 to 1996, which provide some insight into the changing position and rivalry of these 
two states: arms trade, military presence, economic ties to regional states, and diplomatic 
standing. After analyzing the empirical record in these areas, we then move ahead to 
discuss how Russias need for US cooperation at the global level is restricting its actions 
at the regional level. The article concludes with some general points of departure as well 
as a discussion of the relationship between the present empirical work and theory.  
US-Russian Arms Trade in a Third World Context  
Great powers have always sought position in the Third World, sometimes at the expense 
of local actors. The notion of the "New World Order" trumpeted by the Bush 
administration during and after the Persian Gulf crisis (1990-91) held out prospects for 
changing the nature of interaction between the global and regional level. Increased 
emphasis on cooperation, greater efforts at collective security, more reliance on the UN, 
and downplaying the use of force were aspects of this approach, as was a decreased 
emphasis on arms sales from such major exporters as the United States, France, Russia, 
China and Britain.  
In the latter category at least, not much has changed. The United States and Russia have 
historically used arms sales and arms transfers to build influence in the Middle East and 
Third World, and this remains a serious issue to examine in the post-Soviet era. While the 
US has clearly and significantly superseded Moscow as the leading arms supplier to the 
region in the 1990s (see Table 1), Russia has made important strides with Iran and has the 
potential to re-establish its position, despite the fall of the USSR.  
For Russia, arms sales have been and continue to be particularly important for three 
reasons. First, it lacks hard currency, and the relatively rich Gulf states are the worlds 
greatest arms market. Second, Moscow believes that it needs to preserve its massive 
defense industry,11 and that yielding the arms export market to the US and other states 
could put Russian national security in some jeopardy in the long-term. Third, Russia has 
been excluded from regional security frameworks. Indeed, Washington downplayed an 
arms-for-influence approach in the 1980s, noting that arms races lead to war, while 
recognizing that this was the USSRs "primary, if not only means of acquiring 
influence."12  
In the 1980s, Moscow had difficulty translating arms sales into influence over regional 
developments. Gulf states were at least as angered by arms sales to their opponents as 
they were appreciative of receiving arms from Moscow.13 In the 1990s, Moscow faces 
some relatively new, although perhaps short-term problems. The United States is 
resurgent, bolstered by the Gulf war military victory, and Iraq, Moscows erstwhile ally, 
remains an international pariah. Moreover, Russias desire to maintain a good footing with 
the US, as elaborated upon later in this article, remains a constraint on how far it can push 
its arms sales strategy.  
At the same time, the end of the Cold War, and US dual containment policy, which aims 
to contain Iran and Iraq simultaneously, has created some new opportunities for Moscow. 
It has made serious strides in arms sales to Iran, and generated some sales to the smaller 
Arab Gulf states. When economic sanctions are lifted on Iraq, that huge market will also 
open once again for Russian arms sales. Indeed, given Iraqs geographic position amid 
multiple adversaries, any Iraqi regime will likely use oil profits for rearmament.  
While dual containment is in some ways benefitting Moscow in terms of arms sales, the 
US itself remains the main stumbling block to Moscows ability to dominate the regional 
arms market. It has long been a major, and often the dominant, supplier of weapons to the 
region. This trend has continued and even accelerated under the Clinton administration. 
Presidential Decision Directive 34 (PDD 34) makes it clear that the current 
administration "views conventional arms transfers to be a legitimate instrument of United 
States foreign policy.".14 Concrete steps have been taken to promote US arms sales, 
including the establishment of an "Advocacy Center" in the Commerce Department to 
champion US arms exporters and the waiving of fees in many government-to-government 
sales.  
In the post-Soviet period, the United States has become the largest single exporter of 
arms to the region (see Table 1). While the Russians were the dominant arms supplier 
from 1988 to 1991 (providing some 23.8 percent of the Middle Easts weapons), since 
1992, US arms sales have accounted for 48.5 percent of the total market.15 Several factors 
have contributedto this development. While the end of the Cold War has opened markets 
to Russia that before were closed for strategic and ideological reasons, the Gulf War and 
the ensuing embargo against Iraq has virtually shut down Moscows most lucrative 
regional market. On the US side, the Clinton administrations advocacy efforts, and the 
high performance of US versus Russian equipment during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, 
has boosted US export efforts.  
Despite the overall US success in capturing markets, both Moscow and Washington, 
unlike Western European states, have concentrated on particular markets. In the Gulf 
region, the US has focused on Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, while Russia has dealt primarily 
with Iran, Iraq and Yemen. Recent large US military deals with Saudi Arabia include the 
sale of 315 M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks (MBTs) which are very slowly being 
integrated into the Saudi military structure, 400 M2A2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles 
(IFVs), and 72 F-15 fighters. In overall terms, the United States has supplied some 60 
percent of Saudi Arabias $30 billion worth of arms sales since 1991.  
The United States struck lucrative deals in other states as well, including the sale of 218 
M1A2s and 5 Patriot missile batteries to Kuwait, and the sale of retired M-60A3 MBTs to 
Bahrain and Oman. However, US restrictions on the transfer of high-technology systems 
has precluded some potential sales, most notably 16 UH-60L attack helicopters to Kuwait 
and M1A2 MBTs to the United Arab Emirates (UAE).16  
Just as the US has reaped significant export profits from its Saudi connection, Russias 
arms sales and transfers to Iran have proved quite lucrative. It is now Irans biggest arms 
supplier. As a result of Irans military degradation during the Iran-Iraq war and its 
inability to purchase modern Western equipment, Tehran has turned to Russia for new 
weapons systems in a number of areas, including air defense, communications systems 
and surface-to-air missile systems.17  
In a $10 billion arms-for-oil deal, Russia agreed to supply Iran with MiG-29 fighters, Su-
24 fighter-bombers and SA-5 Surface-to-Air-Missiles (SAMs),18 and Russia has aided 
Iran in integrating into its air force the 122 Iraqi aircraft that Iran acquired during the 
Gulf War.19 In 1992, Russia began supplying Iran with T-72 MBTs and both IFVs and 
Armored Personal Carriers (APCs).20 In one of the latest collaboration efforts, Moscow 
has licensed Iran to begin indigenous production of variations of the T-72 MBT (to be 
known as the Zulfiqar) and an APC (to be known as the Boraq). Furthermore, Iran 
became the first Gulf state with submarine capability through its purchase of three 
Russian Kilo-class submarines whose crews are Russian trained. Moreover, Russian 
firms are supplying Iran with support for its long-range missile program. Although it is 
unclear to what extent this is officially sanctioned, such a green light would be hardly 
surprising.  
Russias arms link with Iran has yielded it some influence with Arab Gulf states who 
would prefer that Russia delimit its efforts. For instance, after its submarine sale to Iran, 
Russia negotiated an agreement with the UAE in January 1993 that allowed its naval 
vessels maintenance rights in UAE ports in exchange for pledges to help protect Gulf 
shipping if necessary.21 Hence, its ships now have a new port in the Gulf, which Russia 
appears eager to exploit. Moscow also has concluded a bilateral security agreement with 
Kuwait that covers arms exports and equipment training.22  
The Russian focus on arms sales to Iran, over serious US objections, results to some 
extent from an ongoing desire to jockey for regional influence and to check US power. 
Partly because it seeks independence from and bargaining leverage with the West,23 
Russia strongly resisted repeated US efforts of prevent its sale of submarines and two 
light nuclear reactors to Iran. The effort worked. The sales did not go far enough to 
rupture US-Russian relations at the global level, and yet strengthened Russian links to 
Iran which Moscow sees as a pivotal regional actor. As President Boris Yeltsins chief 
advisor put it, "Iran can be a good and strategic ally of Russia at the global level to check 
the hegemony of third parties and keep the balance of power."  
Clearly, both Iran and Russia, and Iraq for that matter, would benefit from a weakened 
US role in the region. This creates both a tacit and explicit set of common interests that 
facilitate mutual relations. While at present this commonality of interests is not 
particularly threatening to Washington, it could assume such dimensions in the future as a 
result of unforeseen political or military events or gradual shifts in the balance of power.  
Beyond its strategic machinations, Russia is also driven fundamentally by economics. 
Russian arms sales to Iraq dropped from some $4.1 billion from 1988-91 to near zero at 
the official level as a result of the Gulf War and the resulting economic embargo; in 
Yemen, the end of the Cold War caused a $2.1 billion drop from 1988-91 to zero, 
thereafter, partially as a result of the 1994 civil war. And, in Iran, Russia has faced 
increasing competition from China and former Eastern bloc states. In response, it has 
embarked on an aggressive campaign to gain access to markets traditionally closed to it 
by the Cold War, in order to compete more effectively with its transAtlantic rivals.  
In 1993, Moscow combined the three bodies that had traditionally overseen its arms trade 
into a single entity Rosvooruzhenie. The new state-owned import-export company has 
offices in 38 countries and commercial contacts with 60.25 The Russians have had some 
success in diversifying their export market (their worldwide arms exports have rebounded 
since 1993) because their arms cost less than those of other states such as the US.26 In one 
prominent sale, the UAE chose to buy some 330 Russian BMP-3 IFVs over the US 
M2A1 Bradley because of the higher per unit cost of the US vehicle.27 In addition, Russia 
has sold artillery to Oman, the UAE and Yemen and has secured contracts to supply IFVs 
to the UAE, and to sell 30 SA-18 SAMs to Kuwait. Overall, however, Russian arms 
exports to the region remain concentrated on Iran.  
Nonetheless, by once again becoming the principal supplier of arms to the developing 
world in 1995, Russia has demonstrated that it has overcome some of the problems in 
both production and quality that plagued the nations defense-industrial complex at the 
end of the Cold War. Regarding the Persian Gulf, Russia is likely to remain a major arms 
supplier for the immediate future,28 and to use arms sales as a potential influence-building 
instrument in the region.  
Military Presence and Power in Transition  
While Moscows ability to use arms sales for influence has improved in the 1990s, the 
opposite is true of its military. By contrast, the US-led defeat of Iraq in the Persian Gulf 
War has elevated significantly Washingtons status in this regard. While the US is 
constrained by competition from European and other states, by indigenous opposition to 
close ties to the US, and by the enduring difficulties of translating military capability into 
political influence, its demonstrable and unique ability to enforce the regional status quo 
against major aggressors allows it to exert influence in the region at particular junctures.  
During the 1980s, Moscows regional presence was minimal compared to that of 
Washington. It stood to gain more from US policy failures in the region than from any 
unlikely efforts to insinuate itself militarily in the region. The United States built 
influence more than did Moscow by direct intervention. This allowed Moscow to paint 
Washington as an imperialistic state bent on hegemony at the expense of regional states.  
In the post-Soviet era, Moscow has downplayed such rhetoric, although various officials 
still assail US foreign interference in regional affairs as unacceptable, pointing to such 
instances as the September 1996 missile attack on Iraq.29 Moreover, Russia has sought to 
expand its own position. In the post-Gulf War period, it signed an unprecedented defense 
accord with Kuwait, aimed at deterring further aggression through defense cooperation, 
training and exercises, and arms sales. While US influence in Kuwait dwarfs that of 
Moscow, and while Kuwait seeks to downplay this connection in American circles,30 the 
accord was not altogether insignificant. Russia does not pose a direct threat to US 
regional interests in the near term, but if the political-security environment changes 
significantly, contacts with regional states could rebound to Moscows favor, if only for 
purposes of political leverage.  
The US, however, remains pre-eminent as an outside military power. Despite reductions 
in the total number of US forces since the Gulf War, Washington maintains considerable 
over the horizon and in theater capabilities. As a result of the 1991 Gulf War, the US 
naval presence has increased substantially and is now referred to as the US Fifth Fleet. It 
usually includes one aircraft carrier battle group nearby, and, depending on the potential 
for crisis, a variety of other naval combatants. On the ground, the US presence has also 
been enhanced since 1991. After the war, the US-Kuwait Defense Cooperation 
Agreement was signed in September 1991, and provided for US access to Kuwaiti 
military facilities, prepositioning of defense material for US forces, and joint exercises 
and training. While the agreement did not mandate automatic US protection of Kuwait, it 
raised strategic relations to a level unimaginable prior to Desert Storm. Washington also 
updated its access agreement with Oman and Bahrain, and signed a 20 year defense 
cooperation agreement with Qatar on 23 June 1992, which also allowed American access 
and prepositioning.31  
The United States has prepositioned equipment in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and 
has stationed air units and a Patriot battalion in Saudi Arabia.32 In addition, it has some 
form of military access agreement or defense pact with most of the Gulf states (except 
Iran, Iraq, Oman and Yemen). US airpower has also been enhanced. Operation Southern 
Watch, which enforces the no-fly zone over southern Iraq, represents the largest 
combined operating force in the US Air Force. This force can be easily enhanced by US 
aircraft within 24 hours flying distance from the region. Moreover, Washington maintains 
air expeditionary forces for quick response in various states near potential loci of conflict.  
While the US military presence has been enhanced by the Gulf War, Russias has 
decreased in the post-Soviet era. Moscow has removed thousands of military advisers 
from the Middle East, downgraded ties to Syria, Libya and Iraq, and virtually lost its 
position in Yemen and the Horn of Africa. To be sure, Russia does maintain a military 
presence on the regions periphery. Russian advisors still train Syrian troops and Moscow 
maintains a large troop deployment in and around the central Asian states, including 
sizeable deployments in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan.33  
However, this capability cannot easily, if at all, be translated into direct influence within 
the Gulf region. Russias ability to influence Gulf states by threat or use of force was 
highly limited in the 1980s. It has decreased in the past six years, because of the impact 
of the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of US military standing and credibility after 
the Gulf War. While Gulf state leaders did have to factor into their calculations the 
presence of Soviet forces on the periphery of the Gulf during the Cold War, they are far 
less concerned about it now, barring any major shifts in leadership in Moscow.  
By contrast, regional states are acutely sensitive to and aware of US military capability. 
That Washington will be the principal enforcer of the regional status quo into the next 
century is well recognized in many Arab capitals,34 and this can yield Washington some 
influence over Moscow and European states across a range of non-military issues.  
Economic Ties in the Middle East: Globalizing the Market  
While Russia is unlikely to translate its military capabilities into influence in the region, 
it is positioning itself for economic gains with some modest success. Its economic ties 
with Gulf states are proliferating in potentially significant ways. Washington and 
European states, however, still remain far ahead in the economic arena, with the 
exception of Russian inroads with Iran.  
The economic profiles of outside states in the region have changed in important ways in 
the past 25 years, pointing to a greater internationalization of the regional market. Until 
the 1970s, the US was the largest single exporter of goods to the Middle East. However, 
by 1980, Japan had eclipsed it, with Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy 
rounding out the top seven positions.35 During the 1980s, the US steadily lost its market 
share to the European Union (EU) nations which managed to increase their exports to the 
region by an average of 3.5 percent a year.36 As a result of its dual containment policy, 
the US has suspended all trade with Iran and Iraq. Indeed, Clinton dramatically expanded 
existing US sanctions against Iran by banning all US trade and investment with it and 
penalizing foreign companies that trade significantly with Iran.37 Whether or not recent 
efforts by both the US and Iran to seek a rapprochement succeed remains to be seen, and 
in any event will develop slowly, if at all.  
The EU, for its part, has made significant economic progress in the Middle East in part 
because it has focused more on the concept of regional integration and a broad-based 
economic strategy. It seeks to penetrate the region as a whole, and has not let political or 
strategic imperatives derail its approach. By contrast, the United States has concentrated 
primarily on its links to Saudi Arabia, and has altogether excluded Iran and Iraq and 
focused less attention on the smaller Gulf states.  
For its part, Russia seeks to emulate the EU approach in order to enhance its economic 
foothold. Russia signed limited contracts with firms in Bahrain and the UAE that cover a 
range of projects from sea transportation to the production of chemical fertilizers.38 In 
terms of oil development and policy, it aims to coordinate policies with the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in order to stabilize world oil prices.39 
Moreover, it has looked to the Gulf states for both monetary and technical support in 
developing new oil fields within the Federation. Several Gulf states (Kuwait, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE) have underwritten over $2 billion of Moscows foreign debt,40 
and Middle East states accounted for some five percent of the total foreign investment in 
Russia in 1993, a figure that has steadily grown.41  
A UAE company, Gulf Russia, is developing oil fields in southern Russias Stavropol 
area,.42 and Russia, Oman and Kazakhstan have agreed to develop a pipeline from 
Kazakhstan.43 In addition, Russia and Iraq have agreed to allow Russian companies to 
rebuild and repair the heavily damaged Rumaila and Qurna oil fields as soon as UN 
sanctions are eased (the Russians assert that these fields can produce some 1.2 million 
barrels per day).44 As far back as 1994, Iraq signed a trade agreement with Russia worth 
some $10 billion to take effect when sanctions are dropped. The potential profitability of 
this agreement is one reason Russia is pushing the UN to lift economic sanctions on Iraq. 
Indeed, Iraq pledged not only to give Russian firms priority in the sale and delivery of 
goods and services worth some $10 billion, but also to make its repayment of $7 billion 
debt to Russia "a top-priority."45  
For their part, Russia and Iran are developing joint oil exploration projects in the Caspian 
Sea region.46 Irans oil ministry and Russias energy monopoly, Gazprom, signed oil and 
natural gas agreements which would allow Gazprom to invest directly in Iranian oil/gas 
fields and provide transportation of Iranian oil/gas through the Persian Gulf.47 They have 
also worked to prevent the US and other states from penetrating the region. Both states, 
for instance, object to Western plans to build pipelines that would bypass them,48 and for 
strategic and economic reasons, seek some control over pipeline delivered oil. This 
commonality of interests was evidenced when Iran supported Moscows attempts to grant 
itself veto power over future oil projects in the Caspian region, and to extend Russias 
offshore economic zone some 45 miles into the Caspian Sea.49 Russia is also clearly 
eager to exploit problems in Irans relations with Washington and Europe, and must be 
unnerved by the potential improvement in US-Iranian relations. In April 1997, after a 
German court blamed Iran for ordering the assassination of exiled dissidents in Berlin, 
Russia vowed to strengthen ties to Iran. The European Union and the US backed 
Germanys move, while Boris Yeltsin and Gennadi Seleznyov, the Communist speaker of 
the Russian parliament, displayed unusual cooperation in hosting a high-profile visit by 
the head of Irans parliament, Ali Akbar Nateq-Noori.50 Since Germany is Irans largest 
trading partner, Russias support of Iran held out the prospect for economic gains.  
On the whole, while Russia has made some economic gains in the post-Soviet era, several 
factors limit its success. First, it is seeking greater cooperation on oil issues from Gulf 
states as one plank of its attempt to develop economic influence. However, the stagnant 
world oil market has caused OPEC and Gulf states to view Russia more as a potential 
economic rival, in terms of oil exports, than as a partner. This is especially true regarding 
competition for foreign capital to develop new oil fields.51  
Second, Moscows economic potential, like its arms sales, are also limited primarily to 
Iran, and even in Iran, its economic position is dwarfed by that of Germany, France and 
Great Britain. Germany, for instance, currently has a trade surplus of some $1 billion per 
year with Iran. In contrast, without military sales, the total volume of trade between 
Russia and Iran was $520 million in 1994. Moscow, however, predicts that within a 
decade, trade between the two states could grow dramatically once the issue of unpaid 
debts is settled.52  
Third, during the Cold War, Russia used monetary inducements or military support to 
influence Arab states. But, in the post-Soviet era, it cannot as easily use material 
incentives for influence-building purposes. Rather, any financial resources must be 
husbanded for domestic purposes.  
US dual containment policy, the 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the fall 
of the Soviet Union, however, have improved Russian prospects in Iran. In February 
1995, Russia and Iran agreed to develop jointly a desalination plant for Iran. A January 
1996 interbank agreement between the two states settled outstanding financial 
obligations; Moscow now predicts that by the next century annual exports to Iran may 
reach $4.5 billion.53  
The desalination plant was part of a larger agreement that has significant implications for 
the region the sale of two light-water nuclear reactors to Iran. On 8 January 1995, Russia 
agreed to supply Iran with a 1,200 mega-watt and an 800 mega-watt power reactors and 
to provide research and scientific data for Irans universities. In exchange, Iran agreed to 
pay Russia some $800 million. Despite US intelligence data, which indicated that Iran 
was already engaged in a nuclear weapons program and that these reactors would quicken 
its pace, and despite intense pressure from President Clinton during the Moscow Summit 
of May 1995, Russian President Yeltsin adamantly refused to halt the sale. Russia has 
maintained that Iran complies with all of the provisions of International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that all spent fuel would 
be open to IAEA inspection. Moreover, it has defended the agreement as purely 
commercial and charged the US with attempting to limit Russias ability to export 
technology. Moscow pointed to the US decision to sell the same type of reactors to North 
Korea as evidence of US obstructionism. While Russia is unwilling to undermine 
relations with the US over the issue of Iran, it appears willing to push its interests to the 
brink.  
Diplomatic Presence: Russia Has Made Strides  
The economic position and overall influence of both states is related to their diplomatic 
standing, status and access in the region. Improved political relations allow both states to 
jockey for influence on a range of other issues.  
For its part, Russia has made significant strides in the 1990s in advancing it diplomatic 
position in the region, which not only serves its goals in the region, but also beyond it. 
Indeed, Moscow seems to be gambling that improved relations with Iran and the 
conservative Gulf states, as well as Turkey, may provide the leverage necessary to 
forestall future instability in the Federation. This may result from an outgrowth of Islamic 
fundamentalism among Russias 40 million Muslims or among the Muslim states of 
Central Asia, an especially important concern given Russias support of the Serbs in the 
Bosnian conflict. To this diplomatic end, Russia has embarked on a multifaceted effort to 
improve its relations with the Gulf states.  
A better position in the Persian Gulf can facilitate Moscows economic and political 
efforts in the North Caucasus, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia, its competition with Iran 
and Turkey in these areas, and its effort to assert its historic interest on its own border 
areas. Moscow can more effectively compete economically in its own backyard if it has 
better relations with Gulf states, enmeshed in their own rivalries in the same area. Even 
before the end of the Cold War, the USSR was eager to improve relations with the Gulf 
monarchies, an effort which Russia has continued. By the late 1980s, it established 
diplomatic relations with Oman, Qatar and the UAE, and during the 1987 "tanker war" 
leased Kuwait three tankers. However, despite these gains, Moscow, as aptly described 
by the Gulf Cooperation Councils Secretary General Bisharah, was viewed as out of step 
with Gulf states in the 1980s.54 It was constrained by its global ideology, menacing 
military reputation, and dubious intervention in Afghanistan.  
Indeed, Iran repeatedly condemned the Soviet attempt to "crush the brave resistance"55 of 
the Afghan rebels; Irans ambassador to the USSR made it clear that the Soviets actions in 
Afghanistan had "deadlocked their policies in Muslim countries" and had provided 
Washington with "an excuse to increase its influence in their region.".56 It was recognized 
in Pravda that Iran used the Afghan issue "more often than any other pretext to justify 
hostile attacks . . . on the USSRs interests."57 Despite improving relations, the 
Afghanistan issue came up at almost every Soviet-Iranian official meeting through 
1989.58  
After the Afghanistan withdrawal, a series of unprecedented high-level official visits took 
place, touching off a flurry of inter-state interaction. By 1991, Moscow became Irans 
leading arms supplier after having been virtually closed out of the market, at least since 
1982.59 The emphasis placed on Russo-Iranian relations was part of a broad foreign 
policy goal under which Moscow attempted to use Iran as a "partner" to limit US 
influence and to prevent the emergence of other regional powers, especially in Central 
Asia.60  
On the Saudi front, Russia also succeeded in re-establishing diplomatic relations after the 
Gulf War. Moscow had been eager to accomplish this difficult goal throughout the Cold 
War and seemed to be making progress in 1979 after the Iranian revolution and the 
signing of the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel, which hurt US-Saudi 
relations. But it was not until after the fall of the USSR that serious steps were taken. In 
1992, the Russian Foreign Ministry developed and formally implemented a new policy 
toward the Gulf states to develop economic and political partnerships.61 Russia also 
sought to broaden the range of states involved in Gulf security by including Egypt, India, 
Syria and Pakistan.62  
The 1993 agreement between Russia and the UAE, negotiated by then-defense minister 
Pavel Grachev, dramatically expanded arms agreements. These have included the 
aforementioned BMP-3 deal and the purchase of four Ilyushin-76 transport aircraft, and 
high technology sharing. In November 1994, Russian Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin even proposed that the two states collaborate in the development of a joint 
intelligence satellite,63 partly as a platform for expanding Moscows regional contacts.  
While Russia is looking for economic openings with smaller Gulf states, it also remains 
heavily involved in attempting to re-integrate Iran and Iraq into the international 
community. In part, this can help Russia enhance its regional position and check 
Washington. But in the case of Iraq, economic reasons are also critical. In addition to 
recent agreements that would allow Russian companies access to Iraqi oil fields, Russia 
inherited some $8 billion worth of Iraqi credits from the former Soviet Union.64  
Russia and France, which also has considerable economic interests at stake in Iraq, 
remain the most vocal proponents of lifting the sanctions against Iraq. Russia broke with 
the Anglo-American sanctions policy toward Iraq as early as 1993, when Moscow 
dispatched an emissary to Baghdad to work toward Iraqi compliance with international 
demands.65 In 1994, when Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein yet again moved troops toward 
the Kuwaiti border and provoked an international crisis, Moscow attempted to mediate 
between Iraq and the West. In fact, Saddams proposal to withdraw his troops in exchange 
for a lifting of the sanctions was issued in the form of a joint Russian-Iraqi 
communique.66 Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev managed in 1994 to convince 
Saddam Hussein to agree to recognize Kuwaits sovereignty in the hopes that this would 
prompt the UN to alleviate some of the sanctions against Iraq.67  
In the most recent crisis of November 1997, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov played 
a central role in negotiating an end to a crisis triggered by Saddam Husseins refusal to 
allow US inspectors to conduct their work in Iraq as part of the UN inspection teams that 
are ridding Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. While Primakov was widely viewed 
as once again attempting to benefit if not strengthen Saddams position, despite his blatant 
transgressions, in this case, he evidently had Washingtons reluctant imprimatur. Indeed, 
on the whole, Russia has not pushed its efforts to lift sanctions on Iraq to the point that 
they would rupture US-Russian relations. It has neither exercised its veto in the UN 
security council, nor formally argued that the US position on Iraq is untenable.  
Iran, Iraq and Global Intervention  
Historically, the degree of regional influence that Moscow and Washington enjoyed was 
in part a function of their ability to manage and sometimes exploit Irans rivalry with Iraq 
at the regional level, while simultaneously jockeying in their own rivalry at the global 
level. In the 1970s and 1980s, both the USSR and the United States tried to gain 
influence with Iran and Iraq, at the expense of the other superpower.  
The US-Iranian axis was formalized under the Nixon administrations "twin pillar" policy 
which placed Iran at the heart of US regional interests. However, when the Shah 
abdicated his throne in January 1979, Moscow seriously tried to move Iran out of the US 
orbit, only to discover that Ayatollah Khomeinis disdain for the United States did not 
translate into an affinity for Moscow. Nonetheless, the USSR continued to woo Tehran to 
Washingtons chagrin. Thus, the US focused much attention, as was reflected by the 
Irangate fiasco in 1986-87, on severing Moscows relations with Iran, for fear that these 
two states could undermine US regional interests.68  
Similarly, in the 1970s, Soviet-Iraqi relations were formalized by the 1972 Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation. While this relationship continued into the 1980s, it did not 
stop the United States from approaching Baghdad in the early 1980s and then tilting 
toward Iraq after Irans major military victory at the Faw peninsula in February 1986.  
US-Russian competition over Iran and Iraq has eased with the fall of the USSR, but it 
remains at play at a more modest level. Perhaps for the first time in decades, Moscow is 
in a position to affect both Iran and Iraq. For four basic reasons, Washingtons dual 
containment policy, while sensible in some ways, has yielded Moscow influence with 
Iran and Iraq.  
First, dual containment aims to punish Iran and Iraq as rogue states by severing their 
economic, and to some extent, diplomatic links to the international community. This has 
made Moscow more important to both states. They need Russia to help reintegrate them 
into the international community and to counter Washingtons significant political 
influence in various international organizations such as the UN.  
Second, Iran and Iraq cannot use their US connections for bargaining leverage with 
Moscow, as was the case sporadically in the past. This is because all parties realize that 
such connections are non-existent or irrelevant. This increases Moscows influence with 
both states, by depriving Iran and Iraq of the ability to play Russia off the United States.  
Third, in the past Moscow and the United States had difficulty increasing their influence 
with Iran and Iraq simultaneously because these states were at war. While this remains a 
predicament, dual containment policy is creating a potential convergence of interests 
between Iran and Iraq. Since these two very unlikely allies are both targeted by it, they 
have some vested interest in joining against it. This interesting dynamic, in turn, offers 
Moscow greater potential to increase influence with Iran without alienating Iraq, and vice 
versa. A US-Iranian rapprochement, however, would clearly alter this picture by 
decreasing the convergence of interests between Iran and Iraq.  
Fourth, Iran and Iraq have a vested long-term interest in strengthening their Moscow 
links. This is in part because at present neither state is likely to envision very positive 
relations with the United States in the near future. Dual containment does not specify 
clearly the conditions under which the US would move to improve relations with both 
states, other than to require of Iran positive behavior in almost every foreign policy area. 
And, even if it did, these conditions would probably be difficult for Iran and Iraq to 
accept. Moreover, public sentiment in all three states would likely make any 
rapprochement in the near-term politically unsavory, although this could shift in the 
longer run.  
The Global-Regional Link: Interconnectedness in Motion  
In an interconnected world, the behavior and fortunes of states in one arena of interaction 
or issue area is likely to be directly or indirectly linked to phenomena in other arenas or 
issue areas. At the outset of this article, we argued that Moscow is constrained at the 
regional level, partly because of its interest in maintaining good relations with 
Washington at the global level. This section of the article develops this argument.  
Elements in Russias foreign policy establishment remain quite interested in advancing its 
position in Southwest Asia and concerned about US influence there. Relative gains 
clearly matter in US-Russian interaction as suggested by Russian references to balance of 
power, by Russias view of Iran as an actor critical to checking US power, by the zeal 
with which Russia seeks to enhance its regional standing, and by the continuing import of 
the region in Russian global machinations.69 Asked by a Russian news correspondent 
why Russia needs the Middle East, Foreign Minister Primakov said that under peaceful 
conditions, the region would be "one of the strongest economic poles," and that Russias 
general power will increase if it obtains "a far-flung base of support."70 That is, global 
strategy can be aided by a strong regional presence.  
A number of policy makers in Moscow pushed for a more aggressive Near East policy. 
Primakov, who is close to Iraqs elites, including Saddam Hussein, was quite reluctant to 
see Iraqs political and military position undermined by the 1991 Gulf War. As US 
Secretary of State James Baker recalls, Primakov kept on "coming at us with proposals" 
to give Saddam some face saving formula for withdrawing from Kuwait; his idea was 
that Moscow should "not help America in the Persian Gulf, that America is on track here 
to establish a permanent military presence, this is against our interests."71  
Primakov wishes to restore Russian regional influence in a manner that could eventually 
increase areas of conflict and decrease the potential for cooperation. This would 
especially be true if Primakov and others conclude that they can obtain US support at the 
global level better through a more active regional policy than through a more 
accommodating one. As Primakov has stated, after being asked about the loss of Russian 
influence in regions such as Near East:  
We explain our inadequate activity in the Near East by the fact that our efforts were 
aimed at evening our relations with the former cold war adversaries. But this was done 
without an understanding of the fact that, by not surrendering our positions in the regions 
and even strengthening them, we would have paved the way to the normalization of 
relations. A shorter and more direct way.72  
US-Russian interaction in the Third World, however, is linked to interaction at the global 
level in three principal ways. First, at the global level, economic issues have increased in 
importance in the hierarchy of issues, while military factors have become less salient. As 
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev has noted perhaps too optimistically and 
diplomatically, cooperation exists on, "almost every big issue in the world."73  
In fact, while some Russians resent the US and its position on such issues as NATO 
expansion, Russia needs US economic support to make the transition away from empire 
and toward a market economy. It is counting on the "partnership for economic progress" 
understanding between the two states to yield it trade, economic and investment 
opportunities. This is of particular importance, because Russias level of foreign 
investment and trade is paltry for a country of its size. Bilateral trade doubled between 
1992 and 1994 to $5.8 billion74 and could also increase substantially through independent 
business interaction and government coordinated action. The downturn in Asian 
economies in 1997, moreover, has increased Russias need for US economic support, 
chiefly by threatening to divest Russian banks of both foreign and Russian investment. In 
response, Russia has quietly sought loans from Washington to back-up Russian Central 
Bank reserves.  
The Russian-American intergovernmental commission on economic and technical 
cooperation is important to Russia in facilitating US loan guarantees and credits for a 
variety of Russian projects. And US support of Russia economic interests at the 
International Monetary Fund and with the G-7 major industrialized states is also critical. 
In brief, areas of interdependence are expanding between the two states and, arguably, are 
acting as a constraint in cases where the states might prefer conflict to cooperation.  
Second, Russia and the United States also have a vested interest in a range of strategic 
issues. Russia wants to play a role in a new system for European security, and also needs 
US cooperation on the volatile issue of NATO expansion and Bosnia, even as it opposes 
elements of the US approach. The Bosnian imbroglio, moreover, could eventually pit the 
two states on opposite sides, thus making coordination on this issue important. Russia 
needs US cooperation to make sure that US and NATO action do not undermine the 
Serbs, and necessitate a Russian response.  
While differences continue on NATO issues, NATOs cooperation with Russia is, in the 
view of General Shalikashvili, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
"developing, the exchange of delegations is being expanded."75 Numerous initiatives also 
have been undertaken on such issues as the Start II talks on nuclear weapons, sharing of 
spy satellite information,76 and the conversion of Russian defense nuclear companies and 
the safety of existing Russian nuclear facilities and materials.  
Third, even at the political level, Russia needs US cooperation, investment and cultural 
exchange to develop democratic traditions. Indeed, in the June 1992 "Charter of 
American-Russian Partnership and Friendship," Presidents Bush and Yeltsin pledged 
cooperation in this area. Moscows interest in economic, security, and, to some extent, 
political cooperation and interdependence at the global level of interaction benefits 
Washington 77 and circumscribes just how far it can rival Washington at the regional 
level.  
The argument that economic, political and strategic interdependence at the global level is 
constraining Moscows behavior at the regional level is evident in several cases. Moscow 
supports the post-Gulf War UN Resolution 687 against Iraq and US-led sanctions against 
Baghdad, despite its desire to penetrate Iraqs post-war reconstruction market, obtain 
payment for outstanding loans to Baghdad, and re-connect politically with a potentially 
rehabilitated former ally. Were it to undermine Washington formally on these issues, that 
would constitute a threat to movement on US-Russian relations at the global level.  
Similarly, when the US fired 44 cruise missiles at Iraq in September 1996 to punish 
Saddam for attacking the Kurds in Northern Iraq, the Russian leadership did not support 
this action at the UN. This helped it avoid an internal conflict with pro-Iraqi military and 
political factions, and to save face with Iraq, which owes Russia more than $8 billion. At 
the same time, and more importantly, Russia also did not veto or condemn US action. 
Quite the contrary, while many analysts expected a tough Russian stance, Moscow did its 
utmost to assure Washington that its mediation efforts were not directed against US 
interests78 and that it would not undermine cooperation between the two countries as co-
sponsors of the Middle East peace process.79 While this resulted in part from its concern 
about provoking Iran, which US actions against Iraq were benefitting indirectly, it was 
most related to concern about US-Russian relations at the global level.  
On the Iran front, Russia is supplying Tehran with nuclear reactors and various arms. 
However, even on this issue where Russia has overriden economic and political interests, 
it has attempted to present such sales to Iran in positive terms and even to consider 
supplying Iran with equipment that will not "arouse" US objections.80 In some measure, 
Moscow as sought to assure Washington that it will limit its military cooperation with 
Iran, while pursuing aspects of it nonetheless.  
Furthermore, Russia has grudgingly accepted NATO expansion, despite some legitimate 
concerns about its implications. Opposing the initiative altogether could have disrupted 
US-Russian relations. Instead, Russia took a strong stand in part so that it could relax its 
opposition in exchange for benefits from the West, including probable participation in the 
Paris Credit Club and an invitation to the World Trade Organization.81  
At the regional level, we observe ongoing rivalry, mistrust, and potential conflict in US-
Russian relations in the Gulf region. Meanwhile, at the global level, we see growing 
linkages between Russia and the United States at multiple levels and issue areas, the 
limits on risk-taking that both sides face, and the emergence of various areas of 
cooperation. Together, these observations suggest that US-Russian relations in the 
Persian Gulf region remain rivalrous, but that the imperatives of post-Cold War transition 
are likely to prevent this rivalry from re-assuming any serious Cold War dimensions. 
Inasmuch as Russian foreign policy is coherent and unified, Moscow has pushed its 
agenda in the region against US interests, but not so far as to cause a serious rupture in 
US-Russian relations. As one high-level Russian policy maker put it, "We will not let the 
West dictate to Russia how far it can go in its relations. Of course, we will try at the same 
time not to damage our relations with the West."82  
Arguably, Russia is more aggressive in its relations with Washington at the regional level 
than it is at the global level, in part because its Middle East policy makers, who have 
longstanding contacts in the Arab world and not great trust for the US regional role, 
reflect this traditional stance.  
The future of US-Russian relations in the Persian Gulf, to be sure, is contingent on 
numerous factors, many of which cannot be foreseen. However, at the same time, 
important changes are in motion that cannot be reversed easily. It appears that the areas 
where Russia is willing to take major risks in the region have decreased, largely because 
Moscow puts a high premium on strong relations with Washington at the global level.  
It follows that deteriorating relations at the international level will likely have spillover 
effects, by leaving Russia with much less to lose in seriously challenging the US at the 
regional level. Indeed, if, as we argue here, Russias interest in US cooperation on non-
Persian Gulf issues is indeed decreasing its propensity to rival Washington at the regional 
level, then serious conflict over these issues is likely to portend poorly for US-Russian 
interaction on Gulf regional issues.  
In Conclusion:  Conceptualization, Theory and Future Research  
The questions addressed herein are of some broader relevance. While this study has 
focused empirically on the Persian Gulf, the issue of how US and Russian relations are 
expressing themselves in the post-Soviet era in other regions of the world deserves more 
attention as well. This is because the end of the Cold War has altered such dynamics 
across regions. Understanding the changing linkages between the micro- and macro-
levels, however, requires an adjusted frame of reference.  
First, at the broadest level, we need to be more attuned to how the global and regional 
levels of analysis are both distinct and related. This is not just a question of definition. 
Rather, it is one that can yield insights into a range of phenomena that are partly a 
function of these linkages but which are not explained in these terms, and overlooked or 
misunderstood as a result.  
Second, more concretely, this article has emphasized the importance of assessing how 
events at the global level affect the position of a particular state at the regional level. 
Such analyses can yield a better understanding of how a region is changing, and of 
particular outcomes in that region. Thus, the notion advanced here that the fall of the 
Soviet Union in some ways improved Russias economic and political position in the 
Persian Gulf may also yield insight into why and how Moscow could play an important 
role in initially helping resolve the 1997 crisis between the US and Iraq, a crisis triggered 
by Iraqs refusal to allow American inspectors to join UN inspection teams entrusted with 
ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction.  
Third, beyond exploring how the position of a particular state is changing, it is useful to 
examine how the interaction between Moscow and Washington is shifting as a result of 
micro-macro level factors. For instance, developments in one sphere alter outcomes in the 
other, by affecting how nations at both levels perceive, frame, and deal with events, 
opportunities, and challenges at both levels. This micro-macro linkage needs to be better 
understood.  
Understanding this linkage, in turn, requires a better sense of change at both the global 
and regional levels. This is particularly true given that the end of the Cold War has 
significantly altered relations within and between these two levels of interaction. Failure 
to understand how and why this is occurring will likely yield inaccurate analyses of how 
the two levels are related.  
In particular, greater effort is needed to understand how the changing context at both 
levels is altering how sovereign interests are prioritized in both Moscow and Washington. 
For instance, in the present case, we have argued that as compared to the past, Moscow 
now puts a higher premium on US relations at the global level than on its regional goals; 
on economic cooperation than on strategic rivalry in the Gulf. But further questions are: 
to what extent does it emphasize one goal as opposed to another? When will it do so? 
And in what measure and how might it pursue both goals simultaneously?  
Future work might explore these questions in greater detail either through the case study 
approach, or through the logic of two-level game theory which can take into account and 
explore the connection between variables at both the global and regional level. In so 
doing, such work can also make more clear the changing areas of potential cooperation 
and conflict between Washington and Moscow, and, based on this analysis, offer some 
insights into how they can cooperate to deal with regional problems over which they both 
have some influence.  
Fourth, theory-oriented scholars might also explore what global change means for an 
understanding of US-Russian interaction and of theory. Scholars from both the realist and 
liberal traditions have argued that their general theory, and its various intellectual 
progeny such as neoliberalism and neorealism,83 represent a better guide to world politics 
than the opposing school. This debate has been dominated by abstract discussion, which 
has focused on the assumptions, central concepts and arguments of each school. While 
some interesting efforts have been made to examine empirically the relative merits of 
both schools,84 future work would do well to explore these theories against reality.  
Many strains of thought exist within these major schools. However, some basic features 
of both schools can be identified in brief, bearing in mind that for present purposes this is 
intended as a broad sketch rather than as a nuanced account.  
By and large, thinkers in the liberal tradition tend to believe that realists exaggerate the 
importance of states as actors in world politics, dramatize the negative effects of anarchy, 
underestimate the potential for cooperation, and overestimate the potential for conflict 
and the use of force.85 Some of them see world affairs as evolutionary in that states can 
improve their interstate behavior, than as cyclical.86 While both schools recognize the 
importance of anarchy in affecting state behavior, realists and liberal thinkers differ in 
important ways on its nature, impact and severity. Realists stress the negative 
consequences of anarchy, while liberal thinkers feel that while these consequences are at 
play they are not so severe. Liberal thinkers are more sanguine about the possibility that 
such things as regimes, international organizations and sometimes interdependence can 
increase the potential for cooperation under anarchy.87  
To be sure, great power relations even during the Cold War reflected elements of both 
theoretical models. However, the fall of the Soviet Union and developments in the 
Persian Gulf have altered the extent to which both models apply. This is not so much 
because the realist model is not as applicable at the regional level in the post-Soviet era, 
but rather because elements of the liberal model are now more salient at the global level.  
While important changes have taken place at the regional level, both states continue to 
compete for strategic position and influence. They are using various forms of statecraft 
analyzed in this study, such as arms sales, trade and diplomatic access, not only to score 
economic gains but also to enhance their broader influence. Their relations remain 
marked by not insignificant distrust as evidenced by profound US doubts over the nature 
of Moscows nuclear connection to Iran, by US insistence that Russia not be included in 
regional security frameworks, and by doubts in certain circles in Washington about 
Russias negotiating role during the November 1997 Gulf crisis.  
Both states also remain concerned about the gains of the other and interested in checking 
the others power and even undermining it on given issues. Furthermore, relative gains 
clearly matter in US-Russian interaction as suggested by Russian references to balance of 
power, by Russias view of Iran as an actor critical to checking US power, and by the zeal 
with which Russia seeks to enhance its regional standing.  
However, US-Russian interaction at the regional level is linked to interaction at the 
global level. On the whole, elements of both the realist and liberal models apply in 
explaining US-Russian relations in the post-Soviet era. The realist model remains 
relevant at both the regional and international level, but the liberal model is assuming 
greater relevance at the global level. In this sense, the liberal and realist models, and their 
myriad progeny, need not be mutually exclusive. Rather, their use in tandem can be 
useful.88  
The realist model points to ongoing rivalry, mistrust, and potential conflict in US-Russian 
relations in the Gulf region. Meanwhile, the liberal model illuminates the growing 
economic, political, and cultural linkages between Russia and the United States at 
multiple levels and issue areas, the resulting limits on risk-taking that both sides face, and 
the emergence of various areas of cooperation. Together, both models reflect the notion 
that US-Russian relations in the Persian Gulf region remain rivalrous, but that the 
imperatives of post-Cold War transition are likely to prevent this rivalry from re-
assuming any serious Cold War dimensions. Inasmuch as Russian foreign policy is 
coherent and unified, Moscow has pushed its agenda in the region against US interests, 
but not so far as to cause a serious rupture in US-Russian relations. It is fair to say that 
the areas where Russia is willing to take major risks in the region have decreased, while 
the areas of potential cooperation between Moscow and Washington have increased. This 
is in part because Moscow, and to a lesser extent Washington, put a premium on 
maintaining strong relations at the global level. Thus, should these relations falter, 
corresponding negative consequences at the regional level are likely to follow.  
TABLE 1 
US AND RUSSIAN ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE GULF REGION* 
(in millions of dollars) 
   
                                     1988-1991                                                      1992-1995 
 USA Russia USA Russia 
Bahrain 400 0 300 0 
Iran 0 1600 0 1400 
Iraq 0 4100 0 0 
Kuwait 500 200 2400 200 
Oman 100 0 0 0 
Qatar 0 0 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 6600 200 12400 0 
UAE 500 0 700 300 
Yemen 0 2100 0 0 
Total 8100 8200 15800 1900 
*Source:  Richard Grimmett, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 
1988-1995," CRS Report for Congress, 96-677 F (Washington, DC: CRS, 1996); U.S. 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers (Washington, DC:  GPO, various years).  
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